Constitutional Democracy and the Protection of Fundamental Rights: Contemporary Challenges in Modern Governance

Penulis

  • Rizal Wahyudi Penulis
  • Ardiana Ardiana Penulis
  • Sofyan Hadi Penulis

Kata Kunci:

Abusive Constitutionalism, Constitutional Democracy, Democratic Backsliding, Digital Constitutionalism, Emergency Powers, Fundamental Rights, Judicial Review, Populism

Abstrak

Constitutional democracy has long been regarded as the most legitimate framework for safeguarding fundamental rights through the dual mechanisms of popular sovereignty and judicially enforced constitutional constraints. In recent years, however, this model has faced an unprecedented confluence of threats—ranging from democratic backsliding and abusive constitutionalism to the securitization of emergency powers and the rise of algorithmic governance—that collectively erode the protective architecture of rights. While extensive scholarship has examined individual challenges, a systematic integrated analysis that links these phenomena to the functional deterioration of constitutional rights protection remains underdeveloped. This study addresses that gap by constructing a unified analytical framework to assess how contemporary transformations in governance reshape the capacity of constitutional democracies to safeguard fundamental rights. Employing a doctrinal legal methodology combined with comparative constitutional analysis of illustrative jurisdictions, the article identifies four principal patterns of rights erosion: the instrumentalization of constitutional amendment processes, the normalization of perpetual emergency regimes, the displacement of substantive rights by digital surveillance capitalism, and the majoritarian reframing of constitutional identity. The findings reveal that rights protection is increasingly undermined not through outright abolition but through sustained procedural and discursive subversion that preserves formal constitutional structures while emptying them of normative force. The study contributes a novel theoretical lens—constitutional simulacra—to explain how rights protection can be simultaneously affirmed and neutralized. Practical implications for judicial design, transnational constitutional oversight, and civil society resilience are discussed

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Diterbitkan

2024-06-03